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Abstract
Rates of permanent economic migration by women into urban India have been low and falling, in contrast
to other parts of the world where urban capital has drawn upon young, single women as a reserve army of
labor. In this paper I use NSS surveys from 1983 to 2008 to investigate the socio-economic correlates of
economic, follower and marriage migration by women to urban India. The results indicate that low urban
female economic migration rates are not a statistical aberration due to incorrectly designed survey
methodology and that a lack of supply of “good” jobs may be reinforcing male breadwinner norms. I
argue that both falling economic and rising marriage migration rates for urban Indian women appear to be
a result of urban economic inequality and insecurity. This data suggests that it is not the state-market
tussle (that economists tend to be preoccupied with) but rather the interaction between family and market,
and the continuing resilience of the patriarchal family in that struggle, that is the most remarkable feature
of the Indian social and economic landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper brings together two disparate strains of literature on Indian economic development.
The first is the growing body of literature that examines the causes and consequences of strikingly low
and stagnant female labor force participation rates in India, with the debate being over whether particular
trajectories of economic growth in India have resulted either in women’s exclusion from, or their
withdrawal from, the paid labor force. A second strand of literature examines stagnant rates of permanent
economic migration within India, once again exploring the extent to which capitalist development in India
has resulted in “exclusionary” patterns of urban growth and thus posing a similar set of questions about
“push” versus “pull” factors in the Indian economy. This second strand of literature has, however, focused
almost entirely on male economic internal migrants. There is very little by way of systematic exploration
of women’s internal migration patterns in India and the ways in which the latter may be linked to changes
in female productive and reproductive labor, male migration and the broader trajectories of Indian
economic development.
Historical materialist approaches to capitalist development have long recognized the crucial role
of permanent migration (that is coercive to differing degrees) in the creation and maintenance of a labor
force that is divorced from the means of production (Breman 1996, De Haan 1999). In areas like East
Asia or Latin America, the migration of large numbers of young, single women from rural to urban areas
has resulted in some attention to the ways that female migration for employment can serve as the basis for
the development of a capitalist labor force (Sassen-Koob 1984, Standing 1999, Piper 2005). Feminist
research has also shown how women’s unpaid work in Latin America and East Asia can sustain patterns
of circular male migration by ensuring social reproduction in rural areas while men undertake
economically risky urban migration (Chant 1998). This work has helped us reconceptualize migration as
not an individual but a household or community level decision that is predicated upon gender as well as
class inequalities. In the case of India, however, these links remain under-researched, perhaps due to the
absence of large streams of permanent female economic migration.
However, if we look beyond economic migration, or migration driven by the prospect of
employment, we find that Indian women’s overall rates of migration have risen. In particular, there have
been sharp increases in female marriage migration into urban areas over the last few decades1. According
to National Sample Survey(NSS) data, by 2007-08, women migrants comprised 71% of urban, married,
working age women, with rural-urban migrants accounting for about 40% of this migrant population.
Economic outcomes for these women thus have a large and significant impact on measured gender
1

‘Marriage’ migrants in India refer to women (or men) who migrate at the time of marriage in order to
move into their spouse’s home. Patrilocality continues to be the dominant tradition in India, with the wife
moving into the husband’s home after marriage. The husband’s home often includes the husband’s
parents.
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inequalities in urban India today. In particular, the labor force participation of female non-economic
migrants has dropped by more than that of non-migrants. Learning more about the lives of these women
could therefore help us better understand some of the factors driving the declines in urban female labor
force participation in India.
This edited volume highlights the importance of seriously considering the causes and
consequences of unpaid, reproductive labor, once defined as ‘non-economic’, and still left out of many
non-feminist analyses of the economy. I follow this tradition of feminist political economy by examining
forms of migration defined as ‘non-economic’ and arguing for serious consideration of the economic
impacts of such patterns of migration (Lee 2012). Indian women migrants classify themselves
predominantly as “follower” or “marriage” migrants, forms of migration that appear to occur within the
family and thus outside the economy. But, as feminist economists have taught us, the family is a site of
production and reproduction, and economic change cannot be understood without understanding how
household production and reproduction is structured.
In this paper, I trace patterns of female marriage, follower, and economic migration into urban
India from 1983 to 2008 using Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data2. Specifically, I use the four
most recent rounds of the NSS employment-unemployment survey that have asked detailed questions
about migration3. These are the 38th round conducted in 1983, the 43rd round in 1987-88 and, skipping
forward a decade and a half, the 55th round conducted in 1999-2000 and the 64th round for 2007-084.
Given that Indian economic policy shifted to emphasise privatization and market liberalization in the
early 1990s, this data covers both pre- and post-liberalization India.
Since my focus in this paper is on establishing some links between male and female migration
patterns, I restrict my sample to married, working age men and women in urban areas. The NSS surveys
provide information on household consumption expenditure, the demographic characteristics of the
household and occupational details of each household member. NSS data also allows us to categorize
‘principal status’ employment (employment for 183 days or more) as self-employment, regular or salaried
wage employment, casual or irregular wage work, or as unpaid help in a family business. Women who
“Follower” migrants are defined as those who “accompany” the primary migrant or primary earner. The
latter is assumed to have made the actual decision to migrate while the “follower” is usually treated as
passive and without agency in the migration decision. In this paper I do not analyse educational migrants,
who comprise less than 1% of male and female working age migrants. I also exclude international
migrants.
3
The NSS employment-unemployment survey is a quinquennial, nationally representative household
survey, but the module on migration is only intermittently included.
4
The three earlier surveys are ‘thick’ rounds of the quinquennial Employment Unemployment Survey
conducted alongside the consumption expenditure surveys, and the latter 2007-08 is a separate additional
round conducted to specifically investigate migration. However, unlike other thin rounds, the sample size
is similar to those of the ‘thick’ rounds.
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report purely domestic work or the free collection of goods for the household are classified as domestic
workers (and not counted as ‘employed’). All descriptive statistics are reported using NSS population
weights.
It should be noted that this data captures only ‘permanent migration”, defined in India as
occurring when migrants stay a year or longer at the destination5. Field studies provide compelling
evidence that temporary and circular migration has grown tremendously in India over the last few
decades, and the inability of NSS surveys to capture such migration is an issue that requires urgent
attention (Deshingkar and Akter 2009).
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR IN URBAN INDIA
There is widespread consensus that the Indian economy experienced a deepening of its urban bias
after liberalization. Between 1993 and 2008, the urban economy grew from 45% to 60% of GDP based
largely on the growth of services like information technology that employ a relatively narrow group of
urban elites. Vakulabharanam(2010) shows that the most significant beneficiaries of post-1993 economic
growth have been those in these high skill service occupations in urban areas, with the majority of urban
workers actually losing ground over this period. In further evidence of this ‘urban enclave’ model of
development, a number of studies find that inequality between rural and urban areas has risen since the
1990s, while urban areas themselves have become more unequal (Sen and Himanshu 2004, Thorat and
Dubey 2012, Motiram and Sarma 2013).
While agriculture received some flows of public investment in the 1970s and 1980s, since the
1990s rural economic growth has primarily been the result of growth in extractive sectors such as mining,
which tend to have significant negative externalities for local economies, including the displacement and
dispossession of large numbers of rural residents (Jackson and Rao 2012). As a result of the stagnation in
agriculture, the income share of rural peasants and agricultural labourers has declined in relative and
absolute terms as compared to the income share of large farmers and those who are self-employed in nonagriculture (Vakulabharanam 2010). Relatively low- skill informal labor (such as construction work) in
nearby towns and peri-urban areas often provide the highest wage options for rural residents. This means
5

In each case the NSS asks if the current place of enumeration of each household member differs
from the last ‘usual place of residence’ and then the reason for leaving the last ‘usual place of residence’.
The answer to the first questions helps us define the category of ‘migrants’ – those who answer ‘yes’ ;
while the second helps us classify migrants as “economic”, “marriage” etc. Note that when women report
being marriage migrants, they are already in their marital homes. Female marriage migration statistics
thus represent in-migration to the marital household and region. Given that the NSS does not ask about
the woman’s natal family, we do not have information on the exact location (at the district level) or socioeconomic details of the natal home. We are able to use information on the place of last residence to
determine which sectoral stream (rural or urban) the migrant is part of.
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that rural and urban livelihoods in most parts of the country are highly diversified but also highly
precarious, depending upon the ability of household members to move in and out of a number of unstable
and low wage economic activities during the course of a single year.
Due to the prevalence of informalized and unstable employment, Indian employment surveys are
notoriously unable to capture unemployment as it is defined in traditional economics. In contexts where
the meaning of work is constantly changing, self-employment for men or intra-household, domestic work
for women often become residual categories that absorb those who would otherwise be counted as
unemployed. It is notable then that amongst those who are employed in urban India, self-employment is
the only the category of employment that has expanded for urban married men. The share of working age
married men with regular or salaried employment for a majority of the year has steadily dropped from
45% to 39% and the share of those with casual wage work has remained relatively stable. Meanwhile, a
large and growing share of urban married working age women report that their principal occupation is
intra-household work.
The shares of married men in the urban and rural labor force (versus those who may be full time
students or otherwise not in the labor force) have both remained stable and high. In fact, labor force
participation rates for married men (97% in 2008) are significantly higher than for single men of working
age (89% in 2008). On the other hand, urban Indian women have significantly lower labor force
participation rates than rural women. Furthermore, married women have about the same labor force
participation rates as single women in rural areas, but much lower rates in urban India.
Thus urban India is characterized by an extremely strong form of the male-breadwinner ‘classic
patriarchy’ model in which marriage is positively and strongly associated with entry into the labor force
for urban men, and equally strongly but negatively associated with labor force participation for women
(Kandiyoti 1998). The decreases in urban women’s labor force participation and economic migration
would seem to suggest that this model is being even more firmly inscribed over time. As we will see
below, some authors interpret this as a sign of rising economic well-being that allows women to withdraw
from the labor force. I argue instead that while there is clearly a strong normative emphasis on the ‘male
provider’, the data on migration suggests that these norms are being reinforced by India’s urban enclave
model of growth and are a result of economic instability and relative dispossession for a majority of urban
households, rather than a sign of their growing prosperity.
CHANGING PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN INDIA
The existence of growing rural-urban inequality creates an interesting puzzle for researchers of
economic migration in India. Despite what would seem to be almost overwhelming incentives for large
waves of economic migration from rural to urban areas, rates of permanent economic migration into urban
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India remain stagnant and have even declined slightly. As a share of the working age population,
permanent economic migrants declined from 13% to 11% of the urban population. Economic migrants
declined from 32% to 27% of the urban, male, working age married population and from 3% to 1% of the
urban, female, working age married population (Table 1).
According to this data on permanent economic migration, India has lower migration rates than
most other Asian countries (Bell and Muhidin 2009). The literature largely explains this as the outcome of
the Indian government’s hostility to urban in-migrants and the relative under-development of labour
intensive formal sector occupations in Indian cities (Kundu 2009). Such studies have found that men
from relatively higher castes and those who with relatively more education are more likely to engage in
internal economic migration within and to urban areas in India (Dubey et al 2006, Mitra and Murayama
2008, Vakulabharanam and Thakuratha 2012). Kundu and Sarangi(2007) also find that these male urban
in-migrants tend to be relatively well-off (although not the very richest) in urban areas. These authors
thus suggest that what we see in India is not an unwillingness to move, but an inability to do so in a
permanent and stable way. This argument is particularly compelling given the other evidence on the
exclusionary nature of urban Indian growth and the existence of very large and growing streams of
circular migration (Breman 1996, Deshingkar and Akter 2009, Deshingkar and Farrington 2009).
The studies on economic migration have, however, focussed almost entirely on male migrants who
dominate this category of permanent ‘economic’ migrants, going from 86% to 91% of all economic
migrants during this period. While the established story of Indian migration is currently that rates of
permanent migration are very low, that is not what emerges when we look at female patterns of migration.
If we look beyond just economic migration, permanent migrants as a whole have actually risen as a share
of the Indian population –going from 23% in 1983 to 29% by 2007-08 with 87% of this increase
accounted for by the rising share of female migrants – in particular the 90 million additional women who
reported migrating for marriage between 1983 and 2008.
While marriage migrants went from 40% to 52% of working age married women, the share of
women migrating to “follow an earning member of the family” edged down from 18% to 17% while
(Table 1). Putting these numbers together, the share of non-migrants amongst working age married urban
women dropped down to 29% by 2007-08. Of these non-migrants, 53% were never-married and thus
perhaps just not yet eligible for “follower” or “marriage” migrant status. Furthermore, rural-urban (rather
than urban-urban) migrants comprised a growing share of both female economic and marriage migrants.
The male rate of migration (of all kinds) was stagnant over the same period, falling slightly from
18% to 15% of working age, married men, primarily due to a decline in the share of male economic
migrants (Table 1). Male marriage migration was negligible in all rounds (under 1%) and urban follower
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migration has been stable at 4% since 1987-88. This means that men have become less likely to
permanently migrate, even as women are more likely to do so.
EXPLAINING THE LACK OF FEMALE ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN INDIA
Despite the need to more fully explore the multiple forms of migration that women engage in, it
is worth pausing to note that the almost miniscule, shrinking percentage of Indian women who report
migrating for economic reasons is unusual when compared to most other developing countries including
China, South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico or even the United States and United Kingdom in the
nineteenth centuries. Most developing countries have relied upon migrant female workers in what Elson
and Pearson (1981) called the “nimble fingers” phenomenon. In each case, deliberate attempts by state
and capital to culturally legitimate the migration of young, single women from rural to urban areas have
allowed these female migrants to serve as a docile, reliable, and low-paid reserve army (Bagchi 2011,
Standing 1999). The absence of this phenomenon in India is therefore notable (Ghosh 2000).

Disguised economic migration?
One possible explanation for this absence (compared to the historical experience of other
countries) is that the much larger streams of female “marriage” and “follower” migration in India are in
fact disguised forms of economic migration. It is certainly possible that the NSS surveys are misclassifying some economic migration by women as marriage migration (Krishnaraj 2005). However, as
shown elsewhere as well (Rao and Finnoff 2015), the data do not bear out this hypothesis.
First, if the need for employment was indeed driving female marriage and follower migration, we
would expect to see higher economic activity rates for female marriage and follower migrants as
compared to non-migrants (Krishnaraj 2005). However, follower migrants have much lower shares of
economic activity than non-migrants6 (Table 2). Marriage migrants do have slightly higher rates of
economic activity than non-migrants but their employment shares are several times lower than the rates
reported by economic migrants and have fallen considerably over time.
Second, if in fact marriage migration is disguised economic migration, this would mean that
married women move with their husbands with the intent of working at the destination point, much as the
husband does, but then report their move as a move “for marriage”. Thus husbands must also be migrants
and the actual journey made by the man and woman in the household must be identical – they should
both, for example, report moving to the same destination. However, in 2007-08 only 18% of spouses of
We assume here that even if the NSS is failing to capture women’s work and thus underestimating
female economic activity rates, it is equally unable to capture the work of female migrants and nonmigrants, so that differences between these rates and changes over time are likely to be more accurate
than the levels at any given point.
6
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married female marriage migrants of working age were also migrants – as compared to 99% for follower
migrants and 90% for economic migrants(Table 3). Furthermore, this share has dropped 10 points over
the years.
Even if we assume that every one of these female marriage migrants with migrant spouses is
indeed a disguised economic migrant, the overall share of economic migrants would only go up to about
3% of the female, working age, married population in 2007-08, and would not change the narrative of a
declining time trend (down from 4% in 1983). At least in this dataset, it does not seem that a substantial
share of marriage migrants are disguised economic migrants.
Thus we largely analyse the NSS data as at least internally consistent and focus on using it to
understand more about these women migrants. In particular, we use the data to test our two competing
hypotheses about the insignificance and further decline in female economic migration: the first that norms
of sanskritization that have strengthened across castes and regions, resulting in a “withdrawal” effect; the
second that ‘domestic’ work is a residual category that captures increasing female un/undermployment
and the growing burdens of social reproduction within the urban precariat.

Withdrawal versus exclusion
If the low level of and decline in migration for employment by women is indeed a real
phenomenon, and linked to wider declines in female labor force participation, what explains the lack of
interest that Indian capitalists seem to display in exploiting this very large pool of cheap labor?
Ghosh (2000) focuses on the low levels of female workforce participation in the export sector in
India, a key sector for female employment and economic migration in other Asian contexts. She argues
that Indian manufacturing for export has remained trapped in low value-added sectors, which promotes a
cost-cutting, rather than productivity-increasing, mentality. Indian capitalists are thus more interested in
finding ways to sub-contract into the low-cost and low-productivity informal sector. As a result
production for export in India tends not to rely directly upon female workers. Instead it does so indirectly,
to the extent that female workers may be found in the informal sector.
Insofar as migration goes, this kind of urban development mutes the incentive as well as the
ability to migrate permanently, by confining workers to an urban ‘precariat’ not so different from the rural
one they are intimately familiar with. The fact that male permanent migration has also fallen is evidence
in favor of this explanation. Meanwhile, in a context where male livelihoods are fragile, the unpaid labor
of social reproduction that women perform is likely to involve considerable ingenuity and time without
which the urban precariat, upon which the current model of Indian development is based, would not be
able to secure the conditions of its existence. As we will see below, female marriage migrants are now
both a majority of the urban female population as well as most likely to be part of this urban precariat,
8

and the fact that this is the group that has seen the largest increases in female domestic work could be
evidence in favor of such an effect.
A different explanation would link low female economic migration and labor force participation
to a “withdrawal effect” (Abraham 2012). The greater prevalence of female seclusion amongst higher
castes and the fact that symbols of class and caste mobility are deeply intertwined in India, mean that
‘sanskritization’ processes result in women withdrawing from the labor force as household incomes rise
(Srinivas 1998). Several studies suggest that as a result, female labor-force participation in India is
distress driven and correlated with lower levels of female literacy (Eswaran et al 2011, Neff et al 2012,
Abraham 2012), and seen, even within such households, as a failure of masculinity (Qayum and Ray
2011). The absence of female economic migration would thus be an extension of this phenomenon. Its
decline over time could even be seen as a sign of the increased economic status of potential ‘sending’
households in India.
In examining these two hypotheses, the main differences lie in the theorized impact of class (in
the Weberian sense of a combination of education and income) upon female economic migration. If
changes in female migration patterns are being driven by exclusionary urban growth or decreased demand
for female workers, we would expect to see higher class status (education, household per capita
consumption and spousal employment) become stronger predictors of female economic migration as
permanent migrations streams become restricted to ever more narrow groups of the privileged. On the
other hand, if female economic migration is being driven by a withdrawal effect, then it is likely to be
more educated and better off women who drop out first to signal their higher status. Understanding that
marriage and follower migration may also be shaped by these broad economic forces, I examine the
changing class correlates of those forms of migration as well.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN MIGRANTS
As prior research has shown, male economic migrants in urban India appear to belong to higher
class groups. Almost 32% belonged to the top income quintile as compared to 17% of non-migrants
(Table 4) and 70% had some post-primary education as compared to 67% of non-migrants, although
these gaps have narrowed over time (Table 6). Interestingly, while economic migrants were more likely to
have regular or salaried wage employment than non-migrants, there has been a relatively sharp fall in the
share of male migrants with such employment (Table 7) and a corresponding increase in the share of
migrant men who are self-employed. Casual wage worker shares have remained low and stable for male
economic migrants.
Since 1987-88, there has been an increase in the share of male economic migrants whose spouses
report being migrants (Table 3). In particular, a rising share of spouses report being follower migrants.
9

Thus married male economic migrants are more likely to report making the journey with their spouses,
who in turn are less likely to report being economic migrants themselves.
In the case of female migrants, we have three categories of migration to track. Almost 99% female
follower migrants reported that their spouses were economic migrants, and largely shared their husbands’
relatively privileged socio-economic characteristics, while 82% of marriage migrants reported that their
husband was a non-migrant in 2007-08, a percentage that grew from 72% in 1983(Table 3). To the extent
that urban male non-migrants appear to be worse off on average than male migrants to urban areas,
female marriage migrants are the most likely to be part of the urban precariat. This hypothesis is borne
out by a preliminary analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of these women.
As we can see in Table 6, urban female economic migrants, as well as, over time, non-migrants,
had higher shares of post-primary education than marriage migrants. Female economic migrants also had
significantly higher shares of households in the top quintile (Table 4). Follower migrants resembled
economic migrants in this, while marriage migrants have the lowest shares of top quintile households.
A look at the employment profiles of these women and their spouses helps us understand why. Not
surprisingly, female economic migrants are overwhelmingly more likely to be employed with the share of
employed female economic migrants going from 62% in 1983 to 81% in 2007-08 (Table 6). However,
they also had high and growing shares of salaried employment, which come with benefits and are usually
relatively stable (Table 7). Follower migrants had the lowest shares of employment, but it was marriage
migrants who saw the largest declines in employment over this period. Interestingly, economic migrants
and marriage migrants were both comprised of growing shares of rural-urban migrants while follower
migrants were increasingly likely to be moving between urban areas.
Female economic migrants were, however, slightly more likely to belong to the lower caste Dalit
and Adivasi groups (Table 5). This may reflect the relative absence of a tradition of female seclusion
amongst these groups, even though other studies suggest these norms are converging across castes
(Deshpande 2012). It is also possible that what we are seeing here (given the very small absolute number
of economic migrants) is the effect of state affirmative action policies in employment that might increase
the likelihood of Dalit and Adivasi women holding jobs in education or other forms of government
service.
With respect to spousal employment, the first thing to note is that the share of female economic
migrants who are currently married is lower than the average for all urban women. Amongst single
economic migrants, a greater share (20%) were divorced or separated than never married (16%). Overall,
about 43% of female economic migrants had no spouses, and a further 15% had spouses who were not
currently employed. Thus half of female economic migrants were, to use Raka Ray’s terminology,
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‘women without men’, either literally or figuratively7. Meanwhile those with spouses, as we saw earlier,
were a relatively privileged sub-group in every way except their caste status.
Follower migrants were not only the most likely to have employed husbands, but also the most
likely to have employed husbands with salaried jobs, a tendency that has strengthened over successive
NSS rounds (Table 8 and 9). Follower migrants thus emerged as the most likely to fit the narrative of a
genuine “withdrawal effect” –relatively well-off and with spouses in salaried employment.
Female marriage migrants, the only group that actually grew over this period, were the least
privileged across these different metrics. Urban-urban marriage migrants were, however, better off than
rural-urban marriage migrants with 24% reporting being in the top quintile and 29% reporting husbands
with salaried employment, both higher than rural-urban marriage migrants. Rural-urban marriage
migrants were in a much more vulnerable situation economically. Only 11% reported being in the top
income quintile and only 41% reported having any post-primary education at all. And yet, only 20%
reported being employed in 2008.
On almost all metrics non-migrants were close to, but slightly better off than marriage migrants.
They were certainly better educated, had slightly higher shares of top quintile households and higher
shares of spouses with salaried employment but in the latter two cases they were worse off than follower
and economic migrants. They also had lower shares of employed husbands and migrant husbands. Based
on our indicators of household standard of living, they appear relatively economically vulnerable,
although perhaps not as much as marriage migrants.
Non-migrants were also the only other group that saw a decline in the share of women with
employment, although the decline was smaller than in the case of marriage migrants. While follower
migrants continued to have the lowest female labor force participation rates during this time period, our
preliminary analysis thus suggests that is amongst the two most economically vulnerable groups that we
see the greatest declines in female labor force participation.
Looking at categories of female migration separately suggests that while a ‘withdrawal’ story may
fit the situation of follower migrants into urban areas, it is less likely to hold up for marriage migrants.
Furthermore, given the shrinking socio-economic privilege of male economic migrants, it is quite possible
that any socio-economic basis for a withdrawal effect amongst follower migrants is weakening.
Meanwhile, female economic migration has become more concentrated amongst the highest class groups
of those women who are have a spouse.
There is undoubtedly a very strong ‘male provider’ norm that governs the gender division of labor
in urban India. However, this preliminary examination suggests that a lack of supply of good jobs in the
7
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urban economy for both women and men, in conjunction with increases in the burden of reproductive
labor, may better explain the changing migratory patterns we observe than a withdrawal effect that is
driven by rising class status. It would seem useful then to turn to regression analysis to test if these socioeconomic correlations hold up to the introduction of controls.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Where I report regression results, due to considerable endogeneity between the various
independent variables used, I interpret the results as partial correlation coefficients rather than as evidence
of causal mechanisms. In the case of the regressions, I do not use weights both because I am combining
data across different rounds as well as to avoid problems of inflated standard errors and thus levels of
significance. I control for heteroscedasticity by clustering standard errors upon the primary sampling unit,
the village.
Table 10 presents odds ratios for a logistic regression with the dependent variables being the
probability of being an economic, follower, or marriage migrant respectively, within the sample of all
urban, working age, married women. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that a unit change in the
independent variable increases the likelihood of the dependent variable taking the value 1. The size of the
odds ratio(above the value of 1) indicates the size of the increase. Thus an odds ratio of 1.2 indicates that
a unit change in the independent variable causes the dependent variable to become 20% more likely,
while an odds ratio of 0.8 suggests a 20% decrease in the likelihood of its occurrence.
Amongst the independent variables are age in years and a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if the woman has received any post-primary education. I include real monthly per capita household
consumption (in 2011-12 Rupees) as well as the square of the real monthly real household per capita
consumption to account for any U-shaped effects. I am also interested in the differing impact of caste
status upon women’s participation in these different migratory streams. I use dummy variables to signify
membership in the most historically disadvantaged caste groups, Adivasis and Dalits.
The principal occupation at the household level is the occupational category, either selfemployment or wage work, that accounts for the largest share of household income. This is likely to
coincide with the primary earner’s occupation (usually the husband). As we have seen above, economic
and follower migrants are more likely to have spouses who are engaged in regular or casual wage work,
while marriage migrant, who tend to marry non-migrants, are more likely to have spouses who are part of
the urban self-employed. Time dummies for each of the first three NSS rounds are included to capture
changes over time (relative to 2008) that persist after controlling for these variables.
I use the NSS household consumption data to calculate the average urban state-level household
per capita consumption. This helps control for the fact that better off states may attract larger streams of
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male and female economic migrants. I also include the urban Gini coefficient at the state level. Greater
urban inequality, as discussed earlier, may reduce the ability and desire to engage in permanent economic
migration. In previous co-authored work, I also found that urban inequality sharply increases marriage
migration, a finding that is replicated here as well (Rao and Finnoff 2015).
In Table 11, I add two key characteristics of the spouse: a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if the spouse is currently employed, and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the spouse is a
migrant. Based on the preliminary analysis above, married economic migrants are much more likely to
report that their spouses are unemployed and thus that they are ‘pushed’ into the labor force due to the
absence of a male provider. Also, follower and economic migrants are likely to migrate with spouses,
while marriage migrants’ spouses are more likely to be non-migrants. Introducing these variables helps
control for the fact that household income in particular may be a function of the man’s characteristics as
much as the woman’s. It thus helps to isolate any correlations with income that are specific to the woman
herself.
The results largely confirm the preliminary analysis above. Economic and follower migrants are
more likely to be older than other women while marriage migrants are younger. Post-primary education
increased economic and marriage migration but decreased follower migration. Economic and follower
migrant households were more likely to earn a majority of their income from forms of wage work, rather
than self-employment.
Household per capita consumption exponentially increased the likelihood of economic migration
for women, providing more weight to the exclusion hypothesis. However, being Dalit or Adivasi also
increased female economic migration, which suggests that caste based norms about women’s mobility
have not entirely converged yet. As expected based on the exclusion hypothesis, urban inequality lowered
the likelihood of economic migration for women, but this was not statistically significant.
Follower migrants were, as expected, from upper castes with wage work as the primary source of
household income. The inverted U-shaped result for household consumption suggests such migrants’
household are more likely to inhabit the middle of the urban consumption distribution. These are all
results that align with what we know about male urban economic migrants, whom these women report
following. Controlling for the spouse being employed or a migrant did not change any of these results.
As we had seen earlier, male migrants were slightly more likely over time to report that their
spouses were also migrants (rather than perhaps remaining in the village or being urban non-migrants).
Once we controlled for spousal characteristics, the results on the time dummies confirm that the
likelihood of follower migration has actually increased over the rounds. Thus there is an “unexplained”
time trend here that may, as suggested earlier, match the “withdrawal” hypothesis of strengthening norms
against women’s workforce participation for this relatively upper caste and class group. On the other
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hand, this could also be a result of increasing reproductive work burdens that both require men to bring
their spouses with them, and then keep women out of the paid labor force.
The results for marriage migrants echo our prior analysis in almost every respect. They are
younger and live in poorer households (the relationship is exponential) whose income comes primarily
from self-employment. As with economic migrants, Dalits are also more likely to be marriage migrants.
Reminding ourselves that these are also the two primary streams of migration though which rural women
move to the city, the broader conclusion may be that it is Dalit women who are increasingly likely to
migrate to from village to city. These women are thus very much part of the urban precariat, and
controlling for the spouse’s employment and migration status does not change any of these results.
We also find that there has been an increase in the likelihood of such marriage migration and,
very interestingly, that the likelihood of marriage migration increases in poorer states and is strongly and
positively correlated with greater levels of urban inequality. These are results discussed further in other
work (Rao and Finnoff 2015). There we argue that for the families of relatively well-educated rural
brides, marrying their daughters and sisters to men who live in urban areas provides a very valuable
foothold into the urban economy that the highly skewed labor market is unable to afford them. Whether
these women’s lives are improved by becoming part of the urban precariat is an open question, but for the
poorer urban families who receive them, this is not only a much needed and otherwise lacking validation
of status in the most unequal urban areas, but also comes with material benefits given the rising levels of
dowry that accompany such marriages.

DISCUSSION OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS
Patterns of migration suggest some evidence for a “withdrawal effect” amongst relatively well-off
follower migrants, but not for economic migrants or marriage migrants. In particular, the regression
results above clearly indicate that marriage migrants are part of the worst off in urban areas. This makes it
extremely unlikely that their swelling numbers should signal a “shining India” where increasing economic
well-being has made it possible for women to stay home. Instead these migration patterns taken as a
whole tell a story of a population responding in complex ways to an exclusionary urban economy where
labor market opportunities for men and women are highly restricted. The willingness to look beyond
narrow notions of the ‘economic’ reveals that these responses occur through both market as well as
family. In the context of migration, through changes in women’s marriage and follower as well as
economic migration.
It seems likely that many of these women are being shut out of the labor force by a lack of decent
work that can accommodate their reproductive work burdens. However, knowing that so many marriage
migrants are relatively well-educated, rural-urban marriage migrants also suggests that some normative
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status effects may be at work. Field studies show that in rural areas, brides who have a good education
and are able to bring large dowries with them are unwilling to perform ‘hard labor’. They see their
dowries as guaranteeing that they will not have to perform arduous work ‘outside’ (Ramamurthy 2011).
The urban precariat in India has little access to work that is not arduous and thus, as suggested by
Deshpande (2012) and Jackson and Rao (2009), the absence of ‘good’ jobs may reinforce norms of
female seclusion, making women’s labor force participation even less likely. Indeed one could even argue
that women, or rather the family structures that surround them, draw upon these norms to actively resist
becoming cheaper, super-exploited replacements for men and machines.
Srinivas’ original formulation of sanskritization described not an unchanging tradition making its
presence felt but rather a morphing of tradition to accommodate status signalling in a new context of
inequality and social churn (Srinivas 1998). Evidence on dramatic changes in gender norms in recent
years have been provided by a variety of studies showing that norms amongst the lower castes and in the
relatively more gender-progressive southern regions of India have changed to resemble those of the upper
castes in northern India, in a patriarchal “race to the bottom” of sorts (Deshpande 2002 and 2012, Kapadia
1995, Basu 1999, Rahman and Rao 2004). Gender norms in India are thus not immutable (Uberoi 2012).
This body of work suggests that rather than changing to accommodate greater paid female labor force
participation, they have changed to suppress it. I argue here that these changes are a response to
heightened inequality and economic instability. Our “missing” female economic migrants in India may
thus be as much an outcome of the particular model of capitalist development in India as the rising share
of the urban economy in GDP.
In the long term, what we may also have here is a vicious cycle where the failure to create the
kinds of decent work that families in India would be willing to allow their women to perform also
adversely affects decisions to invest in female education. While Indian parents are more likely to send
their daughters to elementary and middle school than before, there has been much less change in rates of
higher education amongst Indian girls. In the NSS data, only 24% of rural 18-year old girls were in
school in 2008, an increase from 1983 but in rural areas, not dramatically so. As Kingdon and Unni(2001)
have shown, in India returns to education increase with higher levels of education so that schooling below
the middle school level has almost no labor market benefits. These are the young girls who would have
been drafted by urban capital in the alternate universe of India-as-China. In India, however, in the absence
of employment that can justify permanent economic migration into and across urban areas, they are ever
more dependent on marriage as the source of their livelihood.
CONCLUSION
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Overall it does appear that the NSS data across these four rounds is fairly internally consistent.
That is, we don’t see any sharp overlaps or inconsistencies in the data that might suggest that disguised
economic migration is high in India, at least when it comes to permanent migration. Instead, economic
migration appears restricted to relatively a small and shrinking group of either well-educated and well-off
women within Dalit and Adivasi groups, or to women without a male provider. While follower migrants
do exhibit some signs of a ‘withdrawal effect’, marriage migrants appear to occupy such precarious
spaces in the urban economy that any such ‘withdrawal’ is unlikely to be a sign of increased prosperity.
Furthermore, the fact that a majority of their husbands are not economic migrants themselves suggests
that it is marriage, rather than employment, that is the direct draw to the city for these women. We are left
with the sense that there is no significant stream of permanent female employment migration in India,
disguised or otherwise.
The absence of a large, labor intensive manufacturing sector in urban India is certainly part of the
reason, but so is the complex interplay between ‘classic patriarchy’ norms about male breadwinners
(which promise women economic security through marriage) and a climate of clear and present economic
insecurity. Economists tend to be preoccupied with the ways in which market and state reshape each
other. But examining patterns of female economic as well as non-economic migration in India remind us
yet again that economic change plays out equally dramatically in the interaction between the family and
market. Indeed it may be that struggle, and the continuing resilience of patriarchal norms in that struggle,
that is one of the most remarkable features of the Indian economic landscape today.
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Tables
Table 1: Share of migrants in the urban, working-age(15-64), married population
Women
Men
All
All migrants Economic Follower Marriage
migrants
Economic
1983
61
3
18
40
37
32
1988
64
2
17
45
36
31
1999
67
2
16
49
33
28
2008
71
1
17
52
31
27

Table 2: Share of those employed(principal and subsidiary status)
Women
Non-migrant
Economic
Follower
Marriage
1983
23
62
15
24
1988
24
66
16
22
1999
22
63
18
19
2008
21
81
15
17

Table 3: Share with a spouse who is a migrant
Women
Non-migrant
Economic
Follower
1983
12
94
98
1988
12
94
98
1999
11
88
98
2008
10
90
99

Table 4: Share in the top consumption quintile
Women
Non-migrant
Economic Follower
1983
18
34
31
1988
21
35
31
1999
25
38
31
2008
24
39
30

Total
23
23
21
19

Men
Non-migrant Economic
96
97
96
97
95
96
95
96

Men
Marriage Non-migrant Economic
28
47
92
27
53
92
23
57
93
18
63
94

Men
Marriage Non-migrant
Economic
19
17
38
17
17
36
17
19
34
17
17
32

19

Total
96
96
95
95

Table 5: Share who belong to Dalit and Adivasi caste groups
Women
Men
Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant
Economic
1983
15
18
15
17
17
16
1988
15
18
14
16
17
15
1999
17
23
16
18
19
16
2008
17
19
17
17
18
17
Table 6: Share with any post-primary education
Women
Men
Non-migrant
Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic
1983
27
31
32
26
44
53
1988
32
41
34
29
47
54
1999
50
54
48
53
60
66
2008
58
59
52
53
67
70
Table 7: Share of those with regular/salaried wage work
Women
Non-migrant
Economic Follower Marriage
1983
5
33
3
4
1988
7
31
3
3
1999
8
38
6
4
2008
7
53
5
4

Men
Non-migrant
Economic
36
65
36
62
34
58
33
56

Table 8: Share with a spouse who is employed
Women
Men
Non-migrant
Economic
Follower
Marriage Non-migrant
Economic
1983
89
84
91
91
19
12
1988
89
82
93
91
18
13
1999
88
83
92
91
17
14
2008
88
75
92
90
17
13
Table 9: Share of women whose spouse has a salaried job
Non-migrant
Economic
Follower
Marriage
1983
38
50
62
40
1988
41
49
58
38
1999
40
50
55
34
2008
36
43
51
33
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of Economic, Follower and Marriage migration for
urban, working age, married women (state dummies included but not reported, available upon request)

Age
Post-primary education
Adivasi
Dalit
Household:Self employed
(log)mpce(2011-12 rs)
(log) mpce squared
State average per capita
consumption
State gini(rural)
Year_1983
Year_1988
Year_1999

Economic migrant

Follower migrant

N= 173967

N= 173967

Marriage migrant
N= 173967

Odds ratio

Std error

Odds ratio

Std error

Odds ratio

1.015***

0.002

1.012***

0.001

0.988***

0.001

1.226***

0.052

0.782***

0.015

1.051***

0.016

2.271***

0.202

0.954

0.048

0.699***

0.035

1.435***

0.092

0.931*

0.027

1.081***

0.026

0.476***

0.022

0.531***

0.010

1.423***

0.019

0.912

0.263

40.709***

13.430

1.053

0.116

1.038*

0.018

0.818***

0.017

0.976*

0.007

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

0.999***

0.000

0.493

0.470

1.664

0.806

134.111***

1.826***

0.243

1.046

0.066

0.274***

0.018

1.559***

0.218

0.998

0.065

0.332***

0.023

1.235*

0.130

0.895*

0.042

0.588***

0.029

*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001
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Std error

64.808

Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of Economic, Follower and Marriage migration for
urban, working age, married women with spousal characteristics included (state dummies included but
not reported, available upon request)
Economic migrant

Follower migrant

N= 131110

N= 131110

Marriage migrant
N=128916

Odds ratio

Std error

Odds ratio

Std error

Odds ratio

Std error

1.009***

0.002

1.013***

0.001

0.990***

0.001

1.288***

0.061

0.873***

0.019

0.991

0.015

2.269***

0.191

0.916

0.047

0.799***

0.027

1.569***

0.096

0.902***

0.028

1.091***

0.021

0.717***1

0.035

0.768***

0.016

1.281***

0.017

0.447***

0.067

2.446***

0.567

1.064

0.111

1.059***

0.010

0.947***

0.014

0.984*

0.007

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

0.999***

0.000

0.569

0.467

2.077

0.873

55.463***

14.723

0.766***

0.053

1.437***

0.053

1.117***

0.025

18.174***

1.216

252.162*** 13.614

0.357***

0.005

1.821***

0.199

0.712***

0.039

0.342***

0.012

1.448***

0.168

0.658***

0.038

0.423***

0.015

1.293***
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001

0.106

0.739***

0.030

0.669

0.016

Age
Post-primary education
Adivasi
Dalit
Household:Self employed
(log)mpce(2011-12 rs)
(log) mpce squared
State average per capita
consumption
State gini(rural)
Spouse_employed
Spouse_migrant
Year_1983
Year_1988
Year_1999
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